Associating and Concealing. Nuclear Testing in French Polynesia, a “Second Contact” between Secrecy and Lies

In 1963, France created the Centre d’expérimentation du Pacifique (CEP), where it carried out 193 tests over 30 years: 46 atmospheric explosions from 1966 to 1974, then 147 underground firings from 1975 to 1996. The choice of site, and then the management of the risk, were based on secrecy, in contradiction with the desire to involve the local population in the construction work and then in the conduct of the tests. The solitary development of a bomb, which strengthened France’s vocation to resist the imperialism of the main Cold War powers, did not prevent the tests from being conducted according to a colonial logic, which once again led to asymmetry of information. Secrecy becomes a form of lying by omission when the risks are concealed and preventive measures are not publicised. Unpredictable events led to urgent decisions to conceal the fallout from the first firing, setting in motion a lasting mechanism. Recently declassified resources document the debate on the advisability of evacuating the inhabitants of the Gambiers after the Aldébaran blast (2 July 1966): the decision-makers’ assessment of the respective risks induced by the fallout or an evacuation shows that the lie is based on an approach that is dissociated from the rationality of the players (the rationality of the experts, the irrational beliefs of the local residents and those carrying out the work). The durability of these representations can be questioned in the light of the current communication from CEA managers, who are still resisting the presidential injunction to declassify their archives.